

ROUTING SLIP

F. 6

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	D/SOVA		X		
18	NIO/USSR		X		
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

AD/OCA plans to prepare response tor DCI signature.

ER 89-1935

Executive Secretary

8 May 89

Date

3637 (10-81)

ER 89-1935

Room H-405, U.S. Capitol
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R89-922

May 3, 1989

Honorable William H. Webster
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

There has been confusion and disagreement among members of Congress, the media and the Executive Branch in evaluating the ultimate purposes and probable outcomes of "glasnost" and "perestroika." This seems partially due to uncertain data on whether Soviet policies are intended or likely to produce "revolutionary" economic, political and security changes.

Western nations face serious political pressures and policy decisions in this area, but there is a tendency to seize on some facts and statements to the exclusion of others. A more orderly, systematic and intellectually rigorous consideration of the various possible explanations for Soviet behavior is needed.

Therefore, we urge U.S. Intelligence to produce a paper presenting alternative theories about the intentions and probable outcome of the Gorbachev government's behavior, each major hypothesis accompanied by associated projections, indicators and guideposts of a tangible nature. The focus would be on actual Soviet behavior, as opposed to promises or rhetoric which might be propaganda. This schema should be available in an unclassified version for public release, as well as a more detailed classified form. Initially, and periodically thereafter, updated information should be supplied on Soviet actions relevant to these hypotheses, again in both classified and unclassified forms.

U.S. Intelligence thereby would perform a major service by providing both a factual and a comprehensive theoretical base for public discussion about which theory of Soviet motivation appears to be the most accurate predictor of Soviet behavior. We anticipate that for some time the situation may be ambiguous and arguable, with Soviet behavior supporting at least portions of conflicting hypotheses; as time passes, however, trends should become more clear.

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
For example, one school of thought is that the Gorbachev government permanently has abandoned strategic superiority for strategic sufficiency and, because of changed economic and ideological motivations, will not seek military dominance or the spread of Marxism-Leninism. In this case, what policy changes should we legitimately expect, e.g. in military spending and production, in the strategic nuclear, strategic defense, chemical/biological and conventional military areas, in arms control negotiation and compliance, and in intelligence activities, propaganda and assistance to revolutionary movements or states? Are domestic political reforms reaching a point where the current or future leadership might be unable to reverse new policy initiatives within a short time, as sometimes occurred in the past?

Others have argued that the Soviet moves probably are indeed motivated by economic problems. However, they see new policies as a clever but relatively temporary expedient. In this view, the retrenchment is similar to past periods of "detente" in that it is designed to bolster Soviet military competitiveness in the long term by focusing more on the domestic economy and eliciting greater technology transfer; an accompanying political campaign to undermine Western cohesion and military spending may succeed in maintaining or enhancing the "correlation of forces" even in the short term, although possibly at a lower overall level of armament. Various permutations of these two basic theories are possible.

We are convinced, however, that at this critical juncture, intelligence consumers deserve and should demand more than watered-down consensus analyses of discrete parts of this puzzle. Moreover, even when taken together, intelligence products sometimes have been confusing. For instance, findings in National Intelligence Estimates on conventional forces and on strategic forces should not reach contrary conclusions about Soviet strategy unless there is a good factual basis for this and a convincing, and prominently discussed, theory of why the Soviets seem to be proceeding differently in these two areas -- a theory which continues to be scrutinized for accuracy as additional facts become known.

We urge you, therefore, immediately to task such a paper, to be provided to the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees in classified form and to the public in an unclassified mode. We believe this paper and its periodic updates not only would enhance the logic and the accuracy of public discussion, but also would benefit US Intelligence by bringing additional rigor and comprehensiveness to the process.

Sincerely,



Henry J. Hyde, Ranking Republican



Robert K. Dornan